法學論著
論著名稱: Randall v. Loftsgaarden 478 U.S. 647 (1986)
編著譯者: 何曜琛戴銘昇
出版日期: 2008.01.01
出 版 社: 台灣 一品文化出版社
I S B N: 9789860120561
集叢名稱: 美國聯邦最高法院憲法判決選譯 第 6 輯
頁  數: 10 點閱次數: 1351
下載點數: 40 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 何曜琛
關 鍵 詞: 公開說明書公開說明書詐欺租稅利益原則經濟淨損回復原狀之損害租稅庇護租稅利益證券詐欺重大的虛偽陳述隱匿不實陳述實際損害原則直接結果原則淨損害額
中文摘要: 我們認為 Section 12(2)的規定清楚,應適用「明確文義」標準:Section 12(2)規定之「已獲所得」並不包含租稅利益,因為「利益」無論如何不能被稱為「所得」。
基於「直接結果原則」,請求回復原狀之一方應返還他方之所得,僅限於由系爭交易標的所產生的「直接結果」:「『直接結果』一詞係指,未有所有人之其他交易行為之介入,單純因為所有或擁有標的物而產生者。」
的確,國會之所以規定公開說明書詐欺之被害人必須交付證券,才能行使回復原狀請求權,目的是為了將證券價值可能下跌的風險移轉給被告,無論此一下跌是否係肇因於詐欺。因此,此處之回復原狀,比起單純填補損害的方法而言,增加了阻止證券詐欺的額外效果。
國會於 Section 12(2)相當明確的闡述公開說明書詐欺的立法目的,本條不僅立法早於 Section 28(a),而且於 1934 年證交法立法時亦未再作修改。因此,我們不認為 Section 28(a)可以限制 Section 12(2)。
我們應假設,有時依 Section 10(b)提起回復原狀的救濟權是適當的。當 Section 28(a)立法時,Section 12(2)是一個允許回復原狀救濟的顯著條文,而且,我們發覺國會並不希望 Section 12(2)的回復原狀權應扣除租稅利益。綜上所述,我們認為 Section 28(a)不應被強加解釋適用於 Section 10(b)。
國會制訂 1934 年證券交易法的目的不僅僅只是為了填補被詐欺投資人的損害而已,國會更有意遏止證券市場的詐欺及操縱行為,以確保對投資決定具有重大性的資訊可以完整的揭露。將原告的救濟過度嚴格地限於「經濟淨損」會破壞這個立法目的。
英文關鍵詞: offering memorandumprospectus fraudtax benefit rulenet economic lossrescissory damagetax sheltertax benefitsecurities fraudmaterialmisrepresentationomissionmisstatementactual damages principle“direct product” ruleout-of-pocket damages
英文摘要: (Section 12(2), we think, speaks with the clarity necessary to invoke this “plain language” canon: § 12(2)’s offset for "income received” on the security does not encompass the tax benefits received by defrauded investors by virtue of their ownership of the security, because such benefits cannot, under any reasonable definition, be termed “income.”)
(Under the “direct product” rule, the party seeking rescission was required to credit the party against whom rescission was sought only with gains that were the “directproduct” of the property the plaintiff had acquired under the transaction to be rescinded: “The phrase ‘direct product’ means that which is derived from the ownership or possession of the property without the intervention of an independent transaction by the possessor.)
(Indeed, by enabling the victims of prospectus fraud to demand rescission upon tender of the security, Congress shifted the risk of an intervening decline in the value of the security to defendants, whether or not that decline was actually caused by the fraud. Thus, rescission adds an additional measure of deterrence as compared to a purely compensatory measure of damages.)
(Congress addressed the matter of prospectus fraud with considerable specificity in § 12 (2), which not only antedates § 28(a), but was also left untouched by Congress when it passed the 1934 Act. We therefore decline to read § 28(a) as mandating a limit on the rescission remedy created by Congress in the 1933 Act by enactment of § 12(2).)
(We shall therefore assume, arguendo, that a rescissory recovery may sometimes be proper on a § 10(b) claim. When § 28(a) was enacted § 12(2) stood as a conspicuous example of a rescissory remedy, and we have found that Congress did not intend that a recovery in rescission under § 12(2) be reduced by tax benefits received. Accordingly, we think § 28(a) should not be read to compel a different result where rescissory damages are obtained under § 10(b).)
(Congress’ aim in enacting the 1934 Act was not confined solely to compensating defrauded investors. Congress intended to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities markets, and to ensure full disclosure of information material to investment decisions. This deterrent purpose is ill served by a too rigid insistence on limiting plaintiffs to recovery of their “net economic loss.”)
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