法學期刊
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論著名稱:
公開發行公司經營者新酬決定機制之實證分析-兼論薪資報酬委員會新制(Shareholder Primacy or Director Primacy? Who Decides Director and Executive Compensation in Taiwanese Public Companies)
文獻引用
編著譯者: 林郁馨
出版日期: 2014.03
刊登出處: 台灣/中研院法學期刊第 14 期/245-317 頁
頁  數: 53 點閱次數: 993
下載點數: 212 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 林郁馨
關 鍵 詞: 經營者薪酬股東會中心主義董事會中心主義薪資報酬委員會董事獨立性
中文摘要: 為避免利益衝突,我國公司法關於董監薪酬之決定,採股東會中心主義。然經本文實證調查上市櫃及興櫃公司之章程後發現,有 84%之樣本公司採取概括授權或僅以「依董監事貢獻程度以及同業水準」等空泛之標準,授權董事會決定董監事之報酬,實質上已轉換為董事會中心主義,大大偏離了原本法規之設計與立法目的。本文從交易成本之觀點分析認為,對大型之公開發行公司而言,以股東會為決議機關所衍生的交易成本遠較董事會為高,董事會方為決定大型公開發行公司董監薪酬之最適機關。我國於2010年修正證券交易法強制上市櫃公司設置薪資報酬委員會,朝向英美以單一董事會為治理架構的方向前進,此修法方向符合經濟分析與目前實務上以董事會為中心之現況,而設置具獨立性之薪資報酬委員會,能避免利益衝突之問題,殊值贊同。
然公司法第 196 條仍採取股東會中心主義,恐削弱薪資報酬委員會的法律上正當性與必要性,本文建議應修正為,非公開發行公司之董監薪酬由股東會決定,而公開發行公司則由股東會決定薪酬決定之程序與架構,董監薪酬之具體數額則由董事會下轄之薪資報酬委員會決定之。此外,薪資報酬委員會監督功能之發揮,實立基於成員之獨立性,然經本研究抽樣實證調查發現,在 505 位具法律上獨立性之薪資報酬委員會成員中,約有三分之一與公司內部人間有所謂社交關係,是否因此削弱其獨立性與監督功能,值得關注。本研究並針對社交關係進行分類與細緻化分析討論,提出修法建議,以強化薪資報酬委員會成員之實質獨立性。
英文關鍵詞: executive compensationshareholder primacydirector primacycompensation committeedirector independence
英文摘要: Corporate self-dealing involves conflict of interests between a corporate insider and the corporation. Director and executive compensation is a typical type of corporate self-dealing. To avoid conflicts of interest, Taiwan's Company Law stipulates that the shareholder's meeting has the authority over the decision of director compensation. This study conducted an empirical investigation of Articles of Incorporation of listed companies in Taiwan and found that 84% of listed companies granted such authority to the board of directors. This article tries to explain such gap between law in books and law in action from the transaction cost viewpoint. This article argues that, in large companies, it is far more efficient for the board of directors to decide director compensation than the shareholder's meeting.
Amendment of Securities Exchange Act in 2010 requires all listed companies in Taiwan to establish compensation committees under the board. However, the Act does not require the members of such committee to be directors. The compensation committee acts as a compensation consultant to the board of directors, which is greatly different from the board committee system in the U.S. This article empirically investigates the social ties among committee members and corporate insiders and finds that around one-third of the sample members have social ties with insiders. Such finding raises concerns over the independence of compensation committee members and their monitoring function over director and executive compensation.
目  次: 壹、前言
貳、薪酬之內涵與種類
一、董監事之薪酬
二、經理人之薪酬
參、薪酬之決定機關
一、董監事薪酬之決定機關
二、經理人薪酬之決定機關
肆、薪資報酬委員會新制
一、簡介
二、隱憂
三、薪資報酬委員會之成員獨立性分析
伍、結論與建議
一、公司法第 196 條之修正建議
二、強化薪酬委員會成員之獨立性
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相關論著:
林郁馨,公開發行公司經營者新酬決定機制之實證分析-兼論薪資報酬委員會新制,中研院法學期刊,第 14 期,245-317 頁,2014年03月。
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