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下市交易中利益衝突之淨化機制:從美國 Dell 公司收購案談起(Cleansing Devices for Conflicts of Interest Underlying Going-Private Transactions: A Commentary on the Management Buyout of Dell Inc.)
編著譯者: 蔡昌憲
出版日期: 2015.06
刊登出處: 台灣/國立臺灣大學法學論叢第 44 卷 第 2 期/533-597 頁
頁  數: 64 點閱次數: 2547
下載點數: 256 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 國立臺灣大學法律學院
關 鍵 詞: 管理階層收購企業併購法審計委員會特別委員會獨立董事受託義務少數股東多數決商業判斷法則揭露義務完全公平標準
中文摘要: 本文探討我國現行公司法、企業併購法(下稱「企併法」)、證券交易法及其法規命令對於涉及管理階層利益衝突之併購案的規範方向;並聚焦於 2013 年 11 月 21 日行政院版之企業併購法修正草案(下稱「企併法草案」)中,與管理階層收購或下市交易有關等規定。本文首先說明美國 2013 年 Dell 公司收購案此一著名案件中的事實及法律爭議,該案收購方之所以安排相關利益衝突淨化機制,似基於美國德拉瓦州公司法所創設之制度誘因。尤其,美國德拉瓦州最高法院於 2014 年 3 月 14 日判決之 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.案中指出,在下市交易中,最能保障少數股東的法律規則,乃鼓勵控制股東若同時提供以下二種程序保障,則不適用完全公平的司法審查標準,而適用商業判斷法則:一、系爭合併案乃由具獨立性之特別委員會(下稱「特委會」)在履行其注意義務之下協商出一公平價格並予以批准,且該特委會經完整授權挑選自己的顧問,更具有逕行拒絕的權力;二、系爭合併案經未受脅迫且具充分資訊之少數股東的多數決同意。相對而言,我國公司法上雖有諸如具利害關係之董事及股東的迴避義務等利益衝突淨化機制,惟在併購交易案中,卻因企併法偏重強化併購彈性之設計(如現行法 18 條第 5 項)而失其作用。特別的是,企併法草案第 18 條第 6 項(即現行法 18 條第 5 項)等迴避豁免條款已擴大其適用的併購類型範圍,此意味著政府為達併購效率之目的,似已不重視安全港程序保障中不具利害關係之少數股東多數決此一機制。換言之,縱令企併法草案第 6 條之修法理由明文參考美國德拉瓦州普通法之精神而引進特委會,卻放棄雙重程序保障之另一支柱-少數股東多數決,此種政策選擇是否非屬完整的公司治理法律移植?惟在此政策方向的現實下,為保障少數股東,吾人不得不將利益衝突淨化機制聚焦於具實權與獨立性之特委會在獲得充分資訊下的多數決同意。進一步言之,不僅應關注特委會之組成與運作(含獨立顧問),且應明確賦與特委會積極對外談判之實權與「否決權」。再加上受託義務之司法審查及股份收買請求權的強化,或始能在投資人保障與利益衝突交易上的經濟需求之間取得平衡點。
英文關鍵詞: management buyout (MBO)the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Actaudit committeespecial committeeindependent directorfiduciary dutyapproval by a majority of minority shareholdersbusiness judgment ruleduty of disclosureentire fairness standard
英文摘要: This essay discusses current Taiwanese regulatory reforms on mergers and acquisitions with interested management involved, examining the Company Act, the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the “M&A” Act), the Securities and Exchange Act, and related rules and regulations. Provisions regulating management buyouts (MBO) or going-private transactions in the draft amendment to the M&A Act proposed by the Executive Yuan (the 2013 proposal) are emphasized in particular. This essay, in the beginning, introduces facts and legal issues in the 2013 Dell Inc. MBO, where Michael Dell’s acquiring group made legal arrangements to sanitize underlying conflicts of interest. This planning might be incentivized by statutory requirements and current development of common law in Delaware. In particular, in Kahn, et al. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., et al. (decided on Mar. 14, 2014), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation (2013) and adopted its formulation of the standard, holding that the business judgment standard of review will be applied in controller buyouts if and only if: (i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a special committee and a majority of the minority stockholders, (ii) the special committee is independent, (iii) the special committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively, (iv) the special committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price, (v) the minority vote is informed, and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.
In contrast, Taiwan’s Company Act initially furnishes cleansing devices such as the duty of interested directors and shareholders to abstain from exercising voting rights. These requirements, however, are exempted under Paragraph 5 of Article 18 of the current M&A Act in merger transactions given the government’s belief in the promotion of merger flexibility. What is more, the 2013 proposal will expand the application of the aforementioned exemption to other M&A types, implying that the government might have decided to further abandon one of the “safe harbor” procedural protections - the approval by a majority of the minority stockholders - just to pursue the M & A efficiency. In other words, the official comment on Article 6 of 2013 proposal reveals that special committees are introduced by referring to Delaware common law doctrines; however, the majority-of-the-minority approval, the other cleansing device of dual procedural protections, is abandoned by the Executive Yuan to a broader extent. This policy choice can be described as incomplete legal transplantation of corporate governance. Faced with this determined regulatory policy, we, in order to protect minority shareholders, cannot but suggest building up supportive mechanisms for the other safeguard - special committees, which should be independent, fully empowered to negotiate and say no, and fully informed before the approval of a majority of committee members. Furthermore, we should pay attention to the composition and operation of special committees and their independent consultants. Together with fiduciary duties clearly defined and appraisal remedies strengthened under the 2013 proposal, we could thus strike a balance between investor protection and economic demand for interested M&A transactions.
目  次: 壹、前言
貳、Dell 公司收購案
蔡昌憲,下市交易中利益衝突之淨化機制:從美國 Dell 公司收購案談起,國立臺灣大學法學論叢,第 44 卷 第 2 期,533-597 頁,2015年06月。