法學期刊
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論著名稱:
評我國強制設置薪酬委員會之立法政策-從經濟分析及美國金融改革法談起(On Mandatory Compensation Committees in Taiwan: An Economic and Comparative Analysis)
文獻引用
編著譯者: 蔡昌憲
出版日期: 2012.09
刊登出處: 台灣/中研院法學期刊第 11 期/249-340 頁
頁  數: 59 點閱次數: 1484
下載點數: 236 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 蔡昌憲
關 鍵 詞: 薪資報酬委員會金融海嘯金融改革法受託義務薪酬揭露薪酬顧問股東諮詢性投票限制型股票代理成本公司治理
中文摘要: 我國立法者於 2010 年 11 月增訂證券交易法第 14 條之 6,強制上市櫃公司(含興櫃公司)設置薪資報酬委員會(下稱「薪委會」),「股票上市或於證券商營業處所買賣公司薪資報酬委員會設置及行使職權辦法」亦續於 2011 年公布,藉此強化我國公司的薪酬規範。惟此強制設置薪委會之政策或屬過於倉促的立法,其可能帶來之衝擊殊值研究。就我國薪委會之法律移植來源國-美國而言,由於金融海嘯暴露管理階層之薪酬過高等問題,美國於是在 2010 年 7 月通過「華爾街改革與消費者保護法」(下稱為「金融改革法」),特別針對公司薪酬議題進一步規範,此舉亦誠將對美國薪酬法制產生重大影響。為從根本上理解我國就薪酬安排應有之管制理念,本文爰先從經濟分析的觀點研析薪酬安排的本質問題;後自比較法觀點,探討美國包含薪委會在內之相關薪酬規範的內涵、發展及其爭議。事實上,對於以獨立董事及薪委會作為薪酬問題的主要解決之道,美國學界實非無爭議;且就公司治理環境而言,我國面對之代理成本問題亦不同於美國欲處理者。從而,我國似不應在欠缺具體配套及在地化調整之下,逕移植如美國金融改革法中之薪委會等薪酬規範。本文除分析我國強制設置薪委會可能產生的影響之外,亦將立基於經濟理論及美國法之研究,深入探討我國薪酬法制現有架構的其他相關問題。
英文關鍵詞: compensation committeefinancial crisisthe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act(the Dodd-Frank Act)fiduciary dutiescompensation disclosurecompensation consultantsshareholder advisory say-on-pay voterestricted stockagency costcorporate governance
英文摘要: Taiwan’s legislature passed Article 14-6 of the Securities and Exchange Act, requiring companies whose shares are listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange or traded over the counter to have compensation committees. The regulations governing the appointment and exercise of powers by compensation committees were subsequently adopted in 2011, with a view to strengthening Taiwan’s compensation regulations. Nevertheless, this legislative policy might be employed in haste and without adequate preparation, such that the impact of these requirements in Taiwan remains to be further inquired. As far as the US, the home jurisdiction of the compensation committee requirements Taiwan just borrowed, is concerned, the global financial crisis exposed the issue of excessive executive compensation. This motivated the US Congress to pass The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, aiming to further regulate executive compensation. This legislation would undoubtedly produce a profound effect on compensation regulations in the US. In order to understand the regulatory philosophy for Taiwan’s compensation-related legal reform, this Article researches into the basics of pay arrangements from an economic perspective. This Article then, from a viewpoint of comparative law, explores the scope, development and debates of US compensation regulations. In fact, US scholars also skeptically discuss whether independent directors and compensation committees should be the primary solution to pay-related regulatory issues or not. Moreover, the main agency problem Taiwan faces is different from that US rules are designed to address. Therefore, Taiwan should not have directly transplanted US compensation regulations including those with respect to compensation committees, without specific supporting policies and local adaptation. In addition to analyzing the potential influence of Taiwan’s legislative policy to require compensation committees, this Article will, based on the above study on the economics of pay arrangements and drawing implications from US rules, delve into Taiwan’s other relevant problems of existing regulations on director and executive compensation.
目  次: 壹、前言
貳、經濟分析
一、薪酬之經濟本質
二、薪酬安排之相關經濟理論
三、小結
參、比較法觀點
一、金融海嘯前之美國普通法及相關法令
二、金融海嘯凸顯之問題
三、金融改革法之回應
四、小結
肆、經濟分析及比較法觀點對我國薪酬規範之啟示
一、我國現行公開發行公司之薪酬規範概說
二、我國與美國面臨不同之代理問題
三、薪委會成員之資格:獨立性及專業性
四、不同身分之薪委會成員的究責問題
五、薪委會之外部司法審查:受託義務的檢驗
六、薪酬顧問:現行法尚無詳細規範
七、股東薪酬表決權之拘束力與薪委會之決議效力
八、我國 2011 年公司法新增之薪酬發放工具:限制型股票
九、強制設置薪委會是否造成過高法令遵循成本?
十、從金融改革法之立法背景省思我國強制設置薪委會之政策
伍、結論
相關法條:
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相關論著:
蔡昌憲,評我國強制設置薪酬委員會之立法政策-從經濟分析及美國金融改革法談起,中研院法學期刊,第 11 期,249-340 頁,2012年09月。
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