法學期刊
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論著名稱:
從經濟觀點論企業風險管理與董事監督義務(Enterprise Risk Management and a Director's Duty to Monitor: An Economic Perspective)
文獻引用
編著譯者: 蔡昌憲
出版日期: 2013.03
刊登出處: 台灣/中研院法學期刊第 12 期/79-152 頁
頁  數: 50 點閱次數: 1463
下載點數: 200 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 蔡昌憲
關 鍵 詞: 金融海嘯事前法律策略事後法律策略行為經濟學團體決策過程認知偏見受託義務商業判斷法則金融改革法
中文摘要: 金融海嘯引發企業風險管理(enterprise risk management, ERM)(下稱「風險管理」)失靈的疑慮,令人質疑企業內部自律機制無法自我監督,從而凸顯風險治理(risk governance)之公司治理問題:何種公司治理機制可有效地達到風險管理的落實。內部自律機制既然難以正常運作,吾人轉而尋求外部他律機制以解決前開問題。詳言之,美國於金融海嘯後,試圖透過相關法令之事前法律策略來加強董事會獨立性,以解決風險治理的難題。惟囿於行為經濟學所凸顯之董事會決策過程中的固有缺陷,相關法令似仍無法促使風險管理獲得有效執行。於是,吾人再轉而思考另一種事後法律策略-美國普通法下之董事監督義務:尤其 2009 年的 Citigroup 案凸顯金融海嘯後,在司法審查標準上是否應將董事監督義務之射程範圍從金融海嘯前的內部控制制度及法令遵循機制層面,擴張到風險管理面向。本文循經濟觀點,贊同 Citigroup 案判決重申維護商業判斷法則的立場-該案判決未將董事監督義務擴及至風險行為之監督。本文透過探索風險治理問題的解決之道,闡明既然不論屬事前法律策略或事後法律策略之外部規範均有其侷限,公司治理問題之解決實無法僅仰賴單一公司治理機制以竟全功,最終仍需要回歸眾公司治理機制間的互補合作,來緩和代理成本問題。
英文關鍵詞: the financial crisisex ante legal strategiesex post legal strategiesbehavioral economicsgroup decision-making processescognitive biasesfiduciary dutiesbusiness judgment rulethe Dodd-Frank Act
英文摘要: The recent financial crisis revealed enterprise risk management(“ERM”)failures while pushing us to reflect on why internal corporate governance mechanisms(“internal mechanisms”)cannot work themselves. This thus highlights a risk governance issue: which corporate governance mechanisms can effectively make ERM function? Since internal mechanisms cannot work themselves, we turn to external corporate governance mechanisms(“external mechanisms”). Specifically, in response to the financial crisis, the US aims to address the gap in risk governance through organizational reforms such as those provided in the Dodd-Frank Act that altered the structure and composition of the board of directors to further strengthen board independence. Nevertheless, such ex ante legal strategies as these legal reforms did not respond to shortcomings in the risk governance, namely, the influence of cognitive biases and structural dynamics on board decision-making processes. Others instead have suggested that an alternative important way of external mechanisms to limit corporate risk-taking lies in stricter enforcement by the courts of the board’s duty to monitor the company’s exposure to risk. In concrete terms, such ex post legal strategies as oversight liability underlies the plaintiffs’ claim in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholders Derivative Litigation(2009). Some scholars propose to expand director oversight liability for ERM failures, beyond the original applications of compliance with existing legal and regulatory obligations prior to the financial crisis. This article, from an economic perspective, countenances the ruling of Citigroup that in order not to be contrary to all the strong policy arguments underlying the business judgment rule, director oversight liability should not be expanded for ERM failures. This article, by searching for ways to address the gap in risk governance, demonstrates that as either ex ante or ex post legal strategies have their own limitations, it’s not easy to alleviate the risk of managerial misconduct by relying only on one of the corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, we need to realize that all corporate governance mechanisms are required to be viewed as a whole, with each of them reinforcing and closing gaps left by others so as to mitigate agency problems.
目  次: 壹、導論:事前法律策略與事後法律策略
一、受託義務之經濟分析
二、董事監督義務概說
貳、事前法律策略之外部他律機制:美國相關法令
一、強化內控制度與法令遵循爭議問題之外部法律規範
二、加強風險管理之外部法律規範
三、從行為經濟學觀點檢視相關法令之規範盲點
參、事後法律策略之外部他律機制:美國法上董事監督義務
一、受託義務之經濟分析
二、董事監督義務概說
三、司法審查標準之演化
四、司法審查標準演化之相關
五、從商業判斷法則之經濟分析思考董事監督義務的射程範圍
六、風險治理問題之解決:公司治理機制間之互補合作
肆、結論與啟示
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相關論著:
蔡昌憲,從經濟觀點論企業風險管理與董事監督義務,中研院法學期刊,第 12 期,79-152 頁,2013年03月。
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