法學期刊
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論著名稱:
電子商務、轉售價格維持與演算法-由歐盟產業調查與華碩案談起
文獻引用
編著譯者: 魏杏芳
出版日期: 2019.10
刊登出處: 台灣/公平交易季刊第 27 卷 第 4 期/1-36 頁
頁  數: 28 點閱次數: 781
下載點數: 112 點 銷售明細: 權利金查詢 變更售價
授 權 者: 魏杏芳
關 鍵 詞: 演算法轉售價格維持一致性行為合意明示共謀默示共謀
中文摘要: 在電子商務時代,線上零售交易蓬勃發展,供應商也會對線上交易實施轉售價格維持措施,並且利用線上市場高度透明性,廣泛應用定價軟體及演算法進行價格決策。歐盟執委會2015年發動的電子商務產業調查結果,肯定這樣的觀察。2018年我國華碩公司在歐盟境內,以應用價格監測演算法協助實施零售商線上轉售價格限制,遭歐盟裁處鉅額罰鍰。該案裁罰的法理,與執委會過去分析並適用歐盟競爭法的架構並無不同,不因電子商務中的演算法而有差別。普遍應用演算法是電子商務時代的重要特徵,技術的進步使演算法功能日愈強大,尤其具深度學習的演算法,更超越人類得以控制的範疇。從競爭法的角度,線上市場透明與演算法的普遍應用,具有促進事業進行勾結的競爭法疑慮。演算法將如何影響事業間合意的成立為本文核心,分別以歐盟華碩案探討演算法與重直限制類型的合意問題,另以歐美既有案例,說明演算法與成立明示共謀或默示共謀的關係。他國執法經驗與政策顯示,雖涉及演算法,只要個案事實與證據在解釋上得以滿足事業間進行溝通的要件,事業間合意與違法勾結即足堪認定,現行競爭法仍能有效適用。至於因利用深度學習演算法致事業間「合意」難以成立,近年國際競爭論壇與主要競爭法國家都支持建立一套規則,從「限制演算法的設計」面向著手管制。公平法第19條的立法與公平會執行實務,向來都不以上下游事業間成立合意為要件,此不僅有競爭法法理上的疑義,也影響處分決定的正確性,且在廣泛運用演算法的電子商務時代,將不利於公平會有效執行第19條。解決之道,解釋上宜將上下游事間的合意,作為該條禁止限制轉售價格的構成要件之一,呼籲學界與實務界共同重視。
英文關鍵詞: Algorithms Resale Price Maintenance Concerted Practices Concurrence of Willingness Explicit CollusionTacit Collusion
英文摘要: On-line retail has gained a tremendous edge in e-commerce in the past several years. According to national statistics, the boost in trade volume via the Internet has substantially contributed to our economic performance. Similar to the practices applied in the circumstances of off-line sales, pricing restrictions such as resale price maintenance (RPM) or recommended resale prices (RRP) are not unusual and are frequently being used by suppliers. Another prevailing feature in today's on-line market is the universal application of pricing software and algorithms, either by suppliers or retailers. The result of a 2015 E- commerce sector enquiry by the European Commission has confirmed this fact and raised competition concerns, therefore leading to subsequent law enforcement actions by the European Commission. A Taiwan-based company, the Asus corporation, was severely fined in 2018 on the grounds of implementing illegal RPM, and adding a price-monitoring algorithm as a re-enforcement measure. The rationale revealed that the Asus case decision by the Commission was totally in line with what it had demonstrated in past Article 101 cases. It is believed that algorithms can facilitate collusion between enterprises, especially when taking into account certain market conditions including the increase in transparency, and high speed and voluminous transactions without a time lag. The main theme of this article is to discuss the relationship between algorithms and the existence of a "concurrence of willingness" among parties, either for horizontal conspiracies including explicit collusion and tacit collusion, or for vertical restrictions such as the implementation of RPM. The author explores whether there are any differences in the pattern of law enforcement and the legal analysis framework when the case in the hands of the authorities relates to an algorithm or not. The Asus Case and other cases are introduced and explained for refer-ence. It is generally recognized that the existing competition law can still be a suitable tool for prosecuting and correcting vertical and horizontal conspiracies, as long as the requisite requirement for conspiracy, namely, an "agreement" or a "meeting of minds", can be established, even in spite of the existence of the algorithm factor. However, when it comes to the so-called deep-learning algorithm, more care is needed when applying the current antitrust rules due to the lack of subjective requirements or an "agreement between undertakings". With regard to the limits of enforcement in this unique situation, a "compliance-by-design" doctrine has recently been introduced in the international competition forum of the OECD, and has gained support from the U.S., the EU, and Germany. In Taiwan, in terms of both the provision itself and the practices of the competition authority, i.e., the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC), an "agreement between undertakings" is not a requirement for establishing a violation of Article 19 of the Fair Trade Act (FTA). The author argues that it is theoretically wrong and would adversely affect the accuracy of the TFTC's decisions. The author calls for the attention of the TFTC and academia in the field of competition law. We should sincerely consider, based on the method of interpretation, including an "agreement between undertakings" as one of the required elements when applying Article 19 of the FTA.
目  次: 一、前言
二、電子商務中事業普遍實施轉售價格維持-歐盟電子商務產業調查的發現
三、轉售價格維持與華碩案中的演算法
四、演算法與競爭法的適用問題
五、他國經驗的啟示與我國執行實務的改進建議-代結論
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相關論著:
魏杏芳,電子商務、轉售價格維持與演算法-由歐盟產業調查與華碩案談起,公平交易季刊,第 27 卷 第 4 期,1-36 頁,2019年10月。
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